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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administratrix of the Estate of LEON L.
CLAUSSE, Deceased,
Plaintiff and A ptp ella;nt,
1

vs.
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a corporation, FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, a
corporation, and AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMpANY, a corporation,

Case No. 7930

Defendants and. Resp,ondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Because Appellant's statement of the fac~.s is Incomplete and leaves out many essential details ·Of the
transactions in question, Respondent insurance company feels it necessary to restate the facts.
In December, 1948, Mr. and Mrs. Leon Clausse
applied for a loan of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars
($2,500.00) from the First Security Bank of Utah, NA,
the loan to be secured by a mortgage on their home
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in Ogden. (Tr. 42). Later in December Mr. S. T. Jeppesen and Mr. Carl Porter, both Vice-Presidents of the
hank, visited the home of the Clausses to appraise it
and advised them that the bank would make the loan.
(Tr. 43). At the time of this visit Mr. Jeppesen suggested to the Clausses that the hank had a plan whereby
the Mortgagor could take out a policy of life insurance
on his life, pay the premiums along with the monthly
payments on ~the ~1:ortgage, and that the insurance proceeds would pay ·off the mortgage in the event of the
death of the Mortgagor and gave Mr. Clausse a pamphlet deseribing the plan (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A").
(Tr. 22-3). On December 18, 1948 the note and the
mortgage were executed by the Clausses (Defendant's
Exhihit ' 'B ' ') .
On December 27, 1948 Mr. Clausse received a letter
from the bank outlining the plan and telling them they
would be given an opportunity to carry it, "if they so
desired," (Plaintiff's Exhibit "C ") and on January
5, 1949 11r. Reynolds Blackington, Soliciting Agent of
Respondent American National Insurance Company,
called on the Clausses to explain the plan and solicit
the necessary insurance. (Tr. 30) In the course of the
diseussion Mr·. Clausse agreed to adopt the plan and
signed an application for life insurance with American
National Insurance Company in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 1). No
premium was paid or tendered at the time the application was signed (Tr.. 40), and no policy was ever issued
or delivered. (Tr. 39) Mr. Clausse died on January 24,
2
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1949 of a sudden heart attack, although he had apparently passed the physical examination of the insurance
company, given shortly after the visit of Mr. Blackington, ( Tr. 32-33).
The application provided in paragraph 4e thereof:
"Insurance liability of the company by reas-on
of this application shall be created ONLY as
follo\vs: One. Either in accordance with ·the
terms of the aforementioned conditional receipt
properly executed and delivered; or Two. By
complete and concurrent fulfillment at the time
of any policy delivery of three (3) conditions
as follows : (i) Issue of such policy and actual
delivery of same during the lifetime and good
health of the person to be insured must have
taken place; (ii) The whole premiu;m (or regular installment thereof) must have been settled
for and accepted by the Company or its authorized agent; and (iii) Neither the Company nor
any person, the Company's agent or not, shall
by such delivery or otherwise determine at the
time thereof the existence of such good health,
but acceptance of such policy by the undersigned
shall be deemed representation that then ~and
theretofore no change in such good health has
taken place since the date hereof.''
.
The ·conditional receipt mentioned above was never
issued, it being still attached to the application and
Appellant makes no claim to coverage thereunder. No
premium was ever paid or tendered and no policy was
ever issued. ( Tr. 39-40)
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence Respondent insurance company moved: (1) to strike all the

3
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testimony of Mrs. Clausse and her son, Roscoe, as to
conversations with Reynolds Blackington on the grounds
(a) that the testimony viola ted the parol evidence rule,
as attempting to vary the ~terms of a written instrument (the application) and (b) that there was no evidence of any authority of Blackington to make any
oral contract on behalf of the insurance company. (2)
To strike the testimony of Mrs. Clausse as to conversations with officers of the Defendant First Security
Bank on the ground that such testimony was hearsay
and incompetent as to Respondent insurance company,
as there was no evidence of any authority of the bank
or its ·officers to act on behalf of the insurance company, and (3) To dismiss the action under rule 41b on
the ground that there was no evidence of any contract
between the insurance company and the Clausses other
than. the application, and that there was no evidence
that either the bank, its officers or Blackington had
any authority other than to solicit the application and
submit it to the insurance company and had no authority to vary its terms (Tr. 68-69). The trial court, after
full argument on these motions, ruled,
"Now at this time gentlemen the Court has
considered the evidence introduced in this trial
by the Plain tiff and in considering the allegations in the Complaint of the Plaintiff the Court
is of the opinion that there is not sufficient fact~
to warrant the cause being submitted to the jury
f.or its deliberation, and at this time a non-suit
is ordered entered in favor of the Defendants
and each of them and their motions are granted
4
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as against the Plaintiff, and that
of the Court." (Tr. 75)

IS

the orde1

It is Respondent's position that this order of the
court was correct
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

NO CONTRACT OF LIFE INSURANCE ON THE LIFE
OF LEON L. CLAUSSE WAS EVER MADE BY RESPONDENT INSURANCE COMPANY.

No insurance liability was created by the application
signed by Leon L. Clausse.
A.

B. No Mortgage Cancellation Plan Agreement was made
with Respondent insurance company.
II.

THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ANY
AUTHORITY OF BLACKINGTO·N OR THE BANK OFFICERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY TO MAKE THE CLAIMED
CONTRACT.

ARGUMENT
I.

NO CONTRACT OF LIFE INSURANCE ON THE LIFE
OF LEON L. CLAUSSE WAS EVER MADE BY RESPONDENT INSURANCE CO·MP ANY.

A. No insurance liability was created by the application
signed by Leon L. Clausse.

The only writing evidencing any dealing between
the Clausses and Respondent insurance company vvas
the application (Defendant's Exhibit 1). That application provided as quoted in the Statement of Facts
that insurance liability of the company could be created
by the application only in accordance with the terms
of the conditional receipt, which was never issued, or
by delivery of the policy during the lifetime and good
health of the applicant and the payment of the premium.

5
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The evidence is clear and undisputed that no policy
was ever issued and no premium paid. In view of that
provision there can be no contractual liability of the
insurance eompany by virtue of the application, nor
can there he any liability on some oral contract between
Clausse and Blackington for insurance coverage contrary to the terms of that application. Such a proposition has already been passed upon by this court in
Field vs. Missouri State Life Insurance Company
77 Utah 45, 290 Pacific 979.
In that ease there had been an application substantially similar to that in the case at bar. One of
the theories of the Plaintiff was that the soliciting agent
entered into a temporary oral contract with the assured to insure his life until such time as the application ·could be acted upon by the proper officer of the
Defendant insurance company. Said this court of such
a contention:
"By the terms of the written application, the
insurance is to take effect at the time the application is approved by the company, provided
the first premium is paid in cash, otherwise it
is not to take effect until the first pren1iun1 i~
paid and the policy delivered to and accepted
by the applicant during his life and good health.
The receipt that was issued to Mr. Field for the
premium paid provides that 'insurance ~ubjeet
to the tern1s and conditions of the policy contract issued shall take effect as of the date of
approval of above application by the company
at its home office in Saint L·ouis, Mo. Other\\·ise
the payment evidenced by this receipt shall be
6
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returned.' The language of the application and
of the receipt is clear and certain. There is no
necessity of resorting to parol testimony to clarify the meaning of the language used in either
the application or the receipt. It is impossible
to reconcile the 'vritten provisions of the application and of the receipt wherein it is agreed
that the insurance shall take effect upon the
approval of the application by the home office
of the defendant at St. Louis, Mo., with the claim
made by the plaintiff and supported by par·ol
testimony that the insurance should be in force
as soon as the first premium was paid. Under
such circumstances full effect must he given to
the written contract, and the claimed parol
agreement must be disregarded." (290 Pac 979,
983)

In that case the Plaintiff also contended that by
some oral arrangement between the agent and the assured the provision of the application had been waived.
This court also disposed of that contention as follows:
"It would be more in accord with the rule of
law under dis-cussion to say that, when parties
reduce a contract to writing, they thereby estop
themselves from claiming under the terms of a
prior or contemporaneous parol agreement, and
also that by entering into a written agreement
all rights that the parties may have had under
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements are
thereby waived. Under the pleadings and the
admitted documentary evidence in this case it
was not competent for the plaintiff to show that
prior to or at the time that Mr. Field signed the
written application Mr. Cotterell stated that the
life of 1\!Ir. Field would be insured as soon as
he paid the first premium.'' ( 290 Pac 979, 983-4)
7
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In short, the written application, by its very terms,
precludes any liability of the company on that document,
and the parol evidence rule precludes any reliance on
any oral· agreement tending to vary its terms.
Appellant apparently recognizes this difficulty for
1n this opening statement counsel for Plaintiff stated:
''We are not suing on the life insurance
policy, that is a matter between the bank and the
insurance company. '' ( Tr. 4)
.And in Appellant's brief at page 14, it is again recognized, counsel stating,
''This is not a suit on said application for life
insurance.''
B. No Mortgage Cancellation Plan Agreement was made
with Respondent insurance company.

To es·cape this situation,· Plaintiff has conjured up
an oral "mortgage cancellation plan", whereby the
agreement was to insure the mortgage on the Clausse's
home, not to insure the life of Mr. Clausse. (Appellant's
Brief Page 2) Under this theory Plaintiff contends
that the making of the ·application for life insurance
to the Respondent insurance company was merely one
of the things which had to be done by the deceased in
order that he might receive protection on his mortgage
under this plan,· and that he had no direct interest in
the life insurance policy, excep·t what might have accrued to him fro1n it under the cancellation agreement
if he had lived to pay off the mortgage. Taking the
statement of this theory from Appellant's brief at
pages 14 and 15 and looking at the same statement
8
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made in counsel's opening statement to the jury at
pages 2, 3 and 4 of the transcript, it is difficult to see
on "That basis the Respondent insurance company could
be a proper party to this action. In fact, after Plaintiff's counsel's opening statement, a motion to dismiss
was made on the ground that such opening statement
failed to state any facts which would constitute a claim
for relief against the Respondent insurance company.
This motion was denied by the court, but the ruling
\vas corrected later \Yhen the motion for dismissal at
the conclusion of Plaintiff's case was granted. But
even taking Appellant's theory of the case, and applying
the rule established by this court that on a motion for
a non-suit there must be given to the Pl:;tintiff the benefit of every fair and legitimate inference that could be
drawn from the evidence by the jury,

Winegar vs. Slim Olson, Inc., ______ Utah ______ ,
250 Pac. 2d 205 (1953),
it is clear that Appellant has no claim for relief against
Respondent American National Insurance Company.
For example, analyze the ·claimed ''mortgage cancellation plan" agreement in order to determine its terms.
A. The Amount of Insurance. The mortgage and
note were for Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($2,500.00), and if the mortgage was to be cancelled
the agreement would have to be for a like amount. The
Appellant admits that this was not so in her Statement
of Facts. (Appellant's Brief, Page 2). The ,claimed
agreement was for only Two Thousand Dollars
9
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($2,000.00), the amount specified in the application for
life insurance which Plaintiff rejects as only a forn1
required by the bank for the purpose of some agreement, not outlined or specified, between it and the in.
surance company (Appellant's Brief Pages 14 and 15),
but certainly the life insurance to be issued pursuant
to the application was the only part of the plan for
cancellation of the mortgage to the tune of Two Thousand Dollars ( $2,000.00) which concerns the insurance
company. And such insurance was never issued, as ~Jr.
Clausse died before the policy was issued and delivered
and before any premium was tendered or paid.
B. The Effective Date. What was the effectiYe
date of the mortgage -cancellation plan claimed by the
Plaintiff~ It is on this point that Plaintiff's evidence
becomes most vague and uncertain, yet it is this date
which is all-important to Plaintiff's right to recovery.
There must be some substantial evidence of the essential facts of an agreement effective at a date prior to
the death of Mr. Clausse in order to entitle Plaintiff
to go to the jury.

Winegar vs. Slim tOlson, Inc.
Supra
This date could not have been on the day in December, 1948 when the two bank officials called at the
Clausse home for appraisal purposes and mentioned
the plan to Mr. Clausse. Exhibit "A" handed to
' plan and
Plaintiff at that time, merely announced the
suggested that the prospect ask for full details thereof,

10
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and there \Yas yet no mortgage to cancel.
It \Yas not, as _._-\.ppellant elaims in her brief at Page
12, the date "~hen the mortgage and note \Yere signed
and deliYered to the bank. Plaintiff testified that Mr.
Jeppesen agreed at that time to send a representative
out to explain the plan and write the insurance. (Tr. 25)
Besides, on Decen1ber 27, 1948, about a week later,
Plaintiff received a letter from the Real Estate Management Company, a subsidiary of the bank, signed by
an officer of the bank, telling them a representative
of the insurance company would call explaining the
plan and give them an opportunity to carry it, "if they
desired.'' (Plaintiff's Exhibit '' C '') Clearly neither
the -Clausses nor the bank believed a ''plan'' was yet in
effect.
The next possibility as to an effective ·date would
be January 5, 1949, when Mr. Blackington ·called to
explain the plan and attempted to sell the necessary
insurance. At the .conclusion of this session Mr. Clausse
executed the application (Exhibit 1), and in arguing
for this date Plaintiff runs into the express terms of
that application. To escape this road block, Appellant
contends that the making of the application to the Respondent insurance company was merely one of the
things which had to be done by Mr. Clausse to receive
the protection on his mortgage under the mortgage
cancellation plan (Appellant's Brief, Page 14).
It has already been shown that neither party
thought there was yet a mortgage cancellation plan
agreement, and it is a basic principle of contract law

11
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that requires no citation of precedents that until there
is a meeting of the minds there can be no contract.
Therefore how could the execution of the application
'
by Mr. Clausse
be merely a step in his performance
of the terms of the mortgage cancellation plan agreement' · And certainly the signing of the application
could not make the cancellation plan agreement effective
as to the insurance company - if it was ever intended
to be a party to such an agreement, as the application
by its very terms, which ·counsel for Appellant claims
he does not seek to vary,· says no insurance, unless and
until delivery of the policy and payment of the premium.
Despite such protestations of acceptance of the
terms of the application (Appellant's Brief, Page 14}
Plaintiff and her son, Roscoe, both attempted to and
were allowed to testify, over the timely objections of
Counsel for Respondent insurance company, that Mr.
Blackington, the soliciting agent, said the insurance
would take effect ''immediately and all during the
period of the mortgage", (Tr. 36), and again, "immediately when the application was signed", (Tr. 38).
Roscoe said Blackington said it "\Vas "in effect", (Tr.
64), which Roscoe guessed to mean when the mortgage
was executed, and even that Blackington said that the
''mortgage insurance'' was in effect, i.e., that the mortgage would be cancelled upon death, irrespective of
whether Mr. Clausse could pass the required physical
examination arranged by Blackington (Tr. 66), although
his mother, the Appellant, admitted that she understood that Mr. Clausse had to pass the physical exmn-

12
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ination ( Tr. 48), to qualify for life insurance.
LeaYing aside for the moment the question of authority of 1Ir. Blackington to make such statements,
it is clear that such testimony is incompetent and in
direct contravention of the parol evidence rule.

Field vs. ltlissouri State Life Insu,rwnce Company
Supra
Plaintiff admitted on cross examination that she
knew and understood that there had to be a life insurance policy taken out a.nd maintained before the
plan could work (Tr. 46), and that the mortgage could
not be credited with any Two Th-ousand Dollar
($2,000.00) payment in the event of the death of Mr.
Clausse unless there 'vas a policy issued by the insurance company (Tr. 48). Therefore, unless the terms of
the application are to be entirely ignored, which Plaintiff says is not the case, the effective date of the coverage under the plan ·could be no earlier than the issuance of the policy during the lifetime and good health
of Mr. Clausse, and the payment of the premium, neither
of which events ever occurred.

C. The place of the insurance comp~any in the
mortgage cancellation plan.
Finally, in determining whether ,Plaintiff's evidence
could possibly support any contract with Respondent
insurance company, the part the insurance company was
claimed to play in the plan must be considered. Plaintiff admitted on cross examination (Tr. 46-48} that
she and Mr. Clausse understood the plan contemplated

13
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a life insurance policy on the life of Mr. Clausse payable to the bank to pay off the loan, and that there had
to be su·ch a policy issued be'fore the plan could work.
In other vvords, the only part the insurance company
played in the picture was to write an insurance policy
on the life of the mortgagor with the mortgag·ee bank
as primary beneficiary. Under Plaintiff's theory of a
cancellation plan agreement that was one of the steps
to the plan, but also under this theory the insurance
company could play no other part. It was not lending
the money on the security of the mortgage. It ":a.s not
agreeing to cancel the note and mortgage in the event
of the death of Mr. Clausse. All it "vas to do "ras to
write the insurance policy, and for that purpose ~~rr.
Blackington called at the Clausse 's home to have ~{r.
Clausse sign an application. Unfortunately Mr. Clausse
died before the policy was issued. Counsel for Appellant recognizes in his. brief that if this were the ordinary situation, without the bank and the claimed mort.
gage ·cancellation plan involved, the terms of the application would be definitive. It would be just the not
too unusual case where the applicant for life insurance
dies before the policy is issued or became effective.
J?ringing the bank into the picture and its mortgage
cancellation plan cannot change the legal relationship
of the insurance company with Mr. Clausse. Its contractua~ liability can be based only on the application.
That application, as Appellant admits, says no insurance liability until certain conditions are met, which
all agree were never met.
14
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_,__\nd "·hat about consideration 1 The only consideration to the insurance company \Yould be the actual
payment of the premium. And no premium was ever
paid or ever tendered. On that point alone, it is clear
that the insurance company's participation in the
claimed 1nortgage cancellation plan agreement vvas never
consummated.
II.

THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ANY
AUTHORITY OF BLACKINGTON OR THE BANK OFFICERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY TO MAKE THE CLAIMED
CONTRACT.

Assuming that in some mysterious fashion the
terms of an agreement by the bank and the insurance
company with Mr. and J\1rs. Clausse to provide for a
mortgage cancellation plan can be spelled out fron1
the evidence offered hy the Plaintiff, such agreement
providing that in the event of the death of Mr. Clausse,
the note and mortgage of the Clausses would be cancelled by the bank, in which cancellation the insurance
company would participate, even though it had received
no premium, and issued no insurance policy. What evidence is there of an authorized agent of Respondent
insurance company making such an agreement1 In other
words, by whose magic was this remarkable agreement
claimed to have been created 1
Appellant first relies on claimed statements made
by Mr. Porter and Mr. Jeppesen, two Vice-Presidents
of the First Security Bank of Utah. Now Respondent
insurance company is a Texas corporation engaged in
the life insurance business in Utah and elsewhere. In

15
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order to enter into agreements, no matter how magical
their terms it must act through agents having author'
ity. Even Appellant does not have termerity to claim
that either of these t"\\ 0 gentlemen had authority to act
for the insurance company. She claims apparent authority. Appellant at Pages 6 and 7 of her brief discusses the apparent scope of authority of Jeppesen and
Porter as binding the hank and at Page 17 states that
the facts of the case are of such a nature as to raise a
''strong inference'' that both Blackington and the bank
officers were representing both the insurance company
and the bank.
At Page 16 of Appellant's brief appears a quo~a
tion from a Washington case,
7

Pagni vs. New York Life Insurance Company
173 Wash. 322, 23 Pacific 2d 6,
to the effect that an insurance company, like other ·corporate principals, is· bound by the acts of agents 'vi thin
the scope of their app-arent authority. With this proposition Respondent insurance company cannot and does
not differ. But counsel for Plaintiff neglected to point
out 'that the Washington court first found,
''In the case at bar there was evidence of
apparent authority, a custom of which the insurer had knowledge, a -course of conduct which
it sanctioned, which would warrant a jury in
finding that the insurer had clothed its soliciting
·agent with authority to act for it as he did.~~
23 Pac. 2nd 6 at page 15.
It is submitted that in this case at bar there is no eYi·

16
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1

dence of apparent auth~rity by an agent, apparent or
actual, of the insurance ·company. No custom, no course
of conduct by the insurance con1pany was sho'vn which
would "'"arrant a finder of fact in concluding that Respondent insurance company had clothed Mr. Blackington or either of the bank officers with authority to
act for it as Plaintiff claims they did.
Apparent authority is defined in the Restatement
of Agency, Sec. 8, as follows:
''Apparent authority is the p·ower of an apparent agent to affect the legal relations of an
apparent principal with respect to a third person
by acts done in accordance with such p~rincipal's
manifestations of consent to such third person
that such agent shall act as his agent." (emphasis
supplied)
and in Section 27, it is stated that apparent authority
is created by written or spoken words or ·any other
conduct of the principal, which, reasonably interpreted,
causes the third person to believe that the principal
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him. The issue is not, as Appellant contends at Page 8 of her brief, whether the
claimed agents acted in such a way as to justify Mr.
Clausse in assuming they had authority to make the
claimed contract, but whether the principal, i.e the
insurance company, engaged in such conduct as to reasonably create that belief by Mr. Clausse~ That apparent authority requires some conduct by the principal
to establish such authority has been recognized by this
court in
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Malia vs. Giles
100 Utah 562, 114 Pac. 2d 208, at 211,
where it was said,
"The extent of an agent's apparent authority
is not measured by the extent of power exercised
by the agent; bu.t by the p·rincipal's conduct ·with
reference to the power exercised by the agent.
Either by action or by inaction \Yhere there i~
a duty to act, the principal may create a situation,
the reasonable interpretation of which, by a
third party with whom the agent is about to
deal, is such as to lead that third party to belieYe
that the agent has authority to deal with him as
contemplated. Under such circumstances the
law will hold the principal responsible to that
third party for the results of that deal with tl1r
agent.'' (emphasis supplied)
Such manifestations of conduct to create apparent
authority must be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the transaction as shown by the evidence,

U. 8. Bond and' Fina.nce Corporation
vs.
National Building and Loan Association
80 Utah 62, 12 Pac. 2d 758,
These undisputed facts and circumstances so far as
Jeppesen and Porter are concerned are:
(1) Jeppesen and Porter were not employees of
the insurance company. They were ·officers of the First
Security Bank. They were not even apparent agent~
of the insurance company.
(2)

Jeppesen was .an old friend of the Claus~e!'
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and his visit to their hon1e in December, 1948 was to
appraise it for a bank loan, at which time, as an old
friend, he suggested they take .out the plan (Tr. 50)
and Plaintiff then understood that Mr. Jeppesen did
not \vrite life insurance (Tr. 50).
(3) The Clausses had never had any dealings with
the Bank or Insurance Company before with respect
to a mortgage cancellation insurance plan ( Tr. 40) ; so
there was not prior ·conduct of either principal upon
which Plaintiff can claim reliance.
(4) The pamphlet (Exhibit "A") made no reference to Respondent insurance company.
(5) The letter of December 27, 1948 suggests the
Clausses consider the mortgage cancellation plan and
referred to Mr. Blackington, the local representative
of American National Insurance Company, whom the
bank was asking to call to explain the plan and to give
them the opportunity to carry it, if tP,ey so desired.
Therefore, until Mr. Blackington called on January
5, 1949, Respondent insurance company had engaged in
no conduct with these Defendants nor in any -conduct
of which these Defendants were aware, which would
create a situation so as to lead the Clausses reasonably
to believe either Jeppesen or Porter had authority to
deal or speak as the agents of the ins-urance company.
In fact, until the letter of December 27, which was after
all the alleged conversations with either Porter or J eppesen, there was not even any mention of the American
National Insurance Company. It is clear and undisputed that Jeppesen and Porter were not agents of the
19
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Respondent insurance company, had no apparent au
thority to act as such, and that any alleged statements
made by them were incompetent and hearsay as to
Respondent insurance company.
The only other person whom Appellant clain1~
acted for the Respondent insurance company to make
the oral mortgage cancellation contract with Plaintiff
· was Reynolds Blackington. "What are the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence as to the conduct
of Respondent insurance company as to him and hi~
authority~

He was the soliciting agent of the insurance
company. He signed the application as such (Exhibit
1), and that same application expressly stated the
methods of creating insurance liability of the con1pany
as only either (a) in accordance with the terms of the
conditional receipt, still attached to the application when
it was introduced in evidence or (b) by delivery of the
policy and payment of the premium. The conditional
receipt referred to expressly provided,
''No a.gen t (which term includes every company representative) is authorized or has any
power to make, modify or discharge the provisions of this receipt, to extend the time for pay.
ing any premium, to waive any Company's right
or requirement or to bind the Company by any
written or ·Oral promise not contained in this
receipt and any policy issued in pursuanre of
such application, except that the Company's
President or Secretary 1nay accomplish all such
acts by a written sta tern en t bearing the signature of the official who made it and the date of
its execution.''
(1)
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This court has made it clear that "\vhen the application expressly so limits the authority of the soliciting
agent he cannot "\vaive the conditions of the application,

Jones vs. New York Life Insurance Con~pany
69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200 at 202.
(2) Nor did Blackington tell the Clausses he had
authority to change or modify the terms of the application (Tr. 38) and the Clausses did not think he had
such authority (Tr. 39).
(3) There had been no previous dealings with
Blackington before (Tr. 40) by the Clauses and they
did not know him (Tr. 29).
There is no other evidence of any other dealing
with this Defendant by Plaintiff or any acts by this
Defendant holding Mr. Blackington or anyone else as
its agent with authority to make a contract of the nature
Plaintiff claims. It is submitted, therefore, that the
testimony of Mrs. Clausse and Roscoe Clausse as to
the alleged statements by Blackington in their conversations with him was incompetent and hearsay as to
Respondent insurance company. It is further submitted
that such testim·ony was incompetent as in contravention
of the parol evidence rule. It is submitted that there
is no competent evidence upon which reasonable men
could find that the Respondent insurance company, on
any basis, became a party to any mortgage cancellation plan or a party to any policy of insurance on the
life of Mr. Clausse.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that for the reasons above shown
the trial court's ruling granting the motions of Respondent insurance company \Vas correct on the facts and
the law.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
& MABEY
PETER W. BILLINGS
.Attorneys for Respondent
American National Insurance Co.
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